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INTERROGATING THE CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
“MASCULINIST PROTECTION” AND MILITARISM 
IN THE SYRIAN CONSTITUTION (1973) AND 
SYRIAN LAWS 
Abstract 
This is a revisionist study of Syrian Ba’athism. At its heart is an examination of ingrained 
masculinist bias. I argue that there is a reciprocal relationship between militarism and 
masculinity, achieved through gratifying protection for both the nation and women. While 
most feminist scholarship dealing with states formation in the Arab context attribute its 
gendered nature to dictatorship, patriarchy and religion there is no debate about the 
development of states, and their relation to militarism and masculinism. This construction of 
militarized masculinity in Ba’ath ideology ensures the preservation of gendered laws that 
perceive women as less equal. While teasing out this aspect, I seek to explore the status of 
women in the Syrian Constitution (1973) and laws by investigating the role of the state as a 
male protector in which women’s rights become challenged by the state’s paternalistic 
perceptions. 
Introduction 
Amidst the violence that has spread across Syria since 2011, questions about how women were 
constructed in the Constitution and Syrian laws prior to the uprising have subsided. This paper 
aims to contextualize the origin of militarism and masculinism prior to the current war to 
highlight how masculinized national ideology, coupled with centralized militarism, has 
maintained and reinforced women’s subordination since the 1970s. I will use Iris Young’s 
model of “the logic of masculinist protection” as being associated with “ideas of chivalry” 
(2003: 4). Central to the logic of masculinist protection is the subordinate status of those 
perceived as in need of protection. By constructing and perpetuating an image of the man as 
courageous, dominating and active, women are positioned as secondary in a vertical 
spectrum. I argue that the perpetuation and gratification of the chivalric male model in the 
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Baˈath ideology and depending on militarism in the early formation of the Syrian state 
correspond to the subordinate status of women in Syrian laws (Nationality Act and Penal 
Code).  
Within this context, investigating the subordinate status of women in both state and society 
takes into consideration that Syrian national identity is being formalized and established by 
a state that is officially secular. In this context, there is a need to stress that scholarship 
about constitutions and legislation in Middle Eastern societies has discussed gender bias 
from various perspectives, mostly in relation to religious patriarchy, tribalism and tradition 
or in relation to women’s changing social and legal status (Shaˈaban, 1991; Hill, 1997; 
Maktabi, 2010). More particularly, in the Syrian context, studies conducted on the gender 
gap have attributed the subordinate position of women to the repressive political climate 
created by the authoritarian Baˈath regime (Manea, 2011; Meininghaus, 2016) or to the 
patriarchal values invested in society (van Eijk, 2016). However, such attempts to connect 
tradition and religion to women’s subordination in the Constitution and laws disregard the 
role of national ideologies in promoting and maintaining gender inequality in those legal 
texts. 
More importantly, contextualizing the historical and political background of legislation 
in Syria, some scholars argue that current laws were enacted under the French Mandate and 
are still in force (van Eijk, 2016: 30). The problem with this kind of argument is that, like other 
feminist studies (van Eijik, 2016; Maktabi, 2010; Manea, 2011), it too disregards the intimate 
link between Syria’s turbulent history (featuring multiple military coups d’état from 1949 
until that of Hafez al-Assad in 1970) and the perpetuation of masculinism in the Constitution 
and laws. In this paper, I argue that the continuation of the colonial legacy seen in Syrian 
laws should be attributed to the consolidation of Baˈathist political ideology and a militaristic 
regime, in which the idealization of the male warrior delineates models of Syrian citizenship. I 
therefore take a different approach: I argue that masculinism is not an element of explanation but 
rather one of interpretation—a tool of what is called ideology critique (Harvey, 1983). 
At the heart of this intellectual interrogation is the conceptualization of the nation as 
an extension of the family, which perpetuates hierarchies based on gender (see Baron, 2005: 
6). When the nation is “envisioned as a family, the concept of family honor could be easily 
appropriated as the basis of national honor” (Baron, 2005: 7). Such configuration of the nation 
as a woman is often closely linked with the emphasis on the role of the man as a masculine 
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protector, defending both women and the nation. This connotation between ˈird (honor) 
and ˈārd (land/nation) combines notions of militarism and masculinity. However, this 
conceptualization of the nation as feminine condensed by the authority of not only the man 
as a masculine protector but also the state, which is prevalent in Syrian legislation. In other 
words, this feminization is juxtaposed with nationalizing women’s sexuality, and imposing 
the state’s authority on their bodies by controlling women’s fertility and legalizing violence 
against them in the name of protecting honor (women’s purity). Nonetheless, this imposition 
of the logic of masculine protection in Baˈath ideology has planted hierarchy in the legal 
narratives by perceiving women as in need of male guardians. Moreover, this authority of 
patriarchal protection enhances the subordination of women and determines their 
relationship to the state. This is reflected in Syrian nationality law, under which women are 
prevented from passing their citizenship to their children. 
I have become convinced that there is a need for a deeper, more sustained and explicitly 
gendered exploration of the multilayered conceptualizations of militarism and masculinism. 
Using Young’s conception, this paper looks at the masculine assumptions underpinning the 
nationalized models propagated in the early emergence of Baˈath ideology, and at how the 
early formation of the Syrian nation-state centralizes the logic of protection by epitomizing the 
role of the army in consolidating the newly emerged state. Without understanding the subtle 
gendering of the 1973 Constitution1 and Syrian laws, we cannot make adequate sense of the 
persistence of a culture that legitimizes the dominance of violence and militarism today. 
Although this paper tackles notions of militarism and masculinism before the Syrian war, this 
investigation of the saliency of martial values since the early emergence of Baˈath ideology in 
the second half of the 20th century follows the construction of hierarchal gendered identity – 
making man the ideal citizen. 
Implicit in the focus of this investigation is the assumption that Baˈathism in Syria has 
developed as a necessary component of the establishment and consolidation of the nation-state. 
As an ideology based on the logic of masculine protection, Young argues that the logic of 
masculinist protection ‘‘includes the image of the selﬁsh aggressor who wishes to invade the 
lord’s property and sexually conquer his women’’ (2003: 4). This logic is based on dominative 
masculinity that defines protective masculinity as its other. Such conceptualization of masculine 
men as protectors therefore entails gratification of ﬁghting and sacriﬁcing for the sake of women 
and the nation (ibid.). This will be reflected in Baˈathism, which plays a role in inventing 
national solidarity and in identifying gender roles. Consequently, this paper has two parts. In 
the first, I will explore the theory of masculinist protection and the role of the state as a male 
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protector. I will then provide an overview of Baˈath ideology and situate it historically by 
identifying the origins of its basic characteristics through looking into its emergence in the 
writings of the three Baˈath ideologues between the 1920s and 1960s: Sati al-Husri, Michael 
Aflaq and Zaki al-Arsuzi. Related to the Baˈath ideology, a section on the early formation of 
the Baˈath state and its relation to militarism and masculinism aims to provide context for the
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historical background of the Syrian Constitution and laws. In so doing, the paper moves into 
the practical establishment of the Baˈathist state since Hafez al-Assad came to power. Such 
exploration of the early formation of nation-state under the Baˈath regime contextualizes the 
construction of gendered constitution and laws in relation to the dominant ideology of the 
Baˈath, and how it has impacted women’s status in the Syrian context. Part II focuses on the 
1973 Constitution and Syrian laws, exploring the construction of political identities in the 
former’s Preamble. I then address the masculinist making of Syrian laws in relation to women, 




As a young woman growing up in Syria, I was initially drawn to the subject of masculinism 
by its importance in reinforcing the cult of Baˈathism during my primary and secondary 
education. An example rich in perpetuating masculinist belonging is the compulsory 
conscription to two Baˈath-affiliated organizations: the Syrian National Organization for 
Childhood (tala'e'e) during the primary stage and the Revolutionary Youth Union (al-
shabibah) in high school. These two organizations mobilized children through enforced 
training and membership of paramilitary groups that perpetuated ideals of masculinist 
militarism, conceptualizing them as expressions of nationhood. More related to the cult of 
subjugation was a weekly compulsory session dedicated to teaching pupils how to become an 
active Baˈathist through using a Kalashnikov, and how to show their love for both the nation 
and the leader, particularly through celebrating a physically strong body. 
Moreover, during enforced mass marches to celebrate the “great leader” (Hafez al- 
Assad during my childhood) and his achievements, we learned by heart the slogan: “with blood 
and soul, we sacrifice ourselves for you, Hafez”,2 another example of how expressions of 
nationhood were identified with masculinist achievements. In fact, these incidents used to 
affect my sense of belonging and identity, as if my existence was blurred by the idealization of 
physical strength, prowess and patriarchal authority. This interplay between loving and 
belonging to the nation, measured by the readiness to sacrifice and die, constructed an image 
of the heroic man as the ideal citizen. Moreover, the dominating image of the heroic soldier 
perpetuates masculinity as the accepted norm in Syrian society. 
Following Haraway’s conception that knowledge is situated, and admitting that the 
knowledge produced in this research is opposed to the point of view of the unmarked (the 
omnipresent positioning) and reflects and is affected by my own specific positioning (Haraway, 
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1988: 586), I cannot deny the influence of my own personal background in this research, as a 
woman and a Syrian and, more importantly, as someone who has lived under this despotic 
and militaristic regime. The experience of living in such environments has led me to 




Theorizing Masculinism and Citizenship 
Before analyzing the construction of masculinism as a protector tool in Baˈath ideology, the 
following subsection aims to set the stage for discussion and provide a common language for 
reading this paper. I provide some working definitions of the most-used terms and how they 
are associated with a perpetuated national ideology in a system of interplaying power relations.  
 
• Masculinity as a nationalized protector 
Due to its wide variety and the fact that there has been no consensus on what constitutes being 
masculine because its meaning varies in relation to class, race and national setting, scholars 
have agreed that masculinity is about an identifiable characteristic that sets the ideals and norms 
for male demeanor (Bederman, 1995; Connell, 1995). At the same time, Jeffords describes 
masculinity as a “set of images, values, interests, and activities held important to the successful 
achievement of male adulthood” (1989: xiii). “Masculinity” is the appropriation of certain sets 
of modes and practices that incite hierarchy and domination of one sex over the other. The 
use of the concept of “masculinity” in this paper aims to encompass several dimensions, and 
will broaden “masculinity” as a corporeal domino for protection, military and chivalry.  
My starting point for the relationship between gender bias and Baˈathism is Young’s 
conception of the logic of masculinist protection. First, Young investigated the subordinate 
position of women by questioning the idealization of the male warrior, and how it has been 
projected onto the behavior of the state. Dominant theorizations on masculinity and 
masculinism identify the masculine male type in which the male is perceived as adamant to 
conquer women sexually in the private sphere. Very little research, however, has linked 
masculinity with the readiness to protect as another form of perpetuating hierarchy and male 
domination. According to Young, this model of masculinism is inherent in the militaristic 
nature of the state, which contributes to a vision where heroic men struggle to protect the 
nation and women. Enloe captures this intersection, 
10  
arguing that “when a nationalist movement becomes militarized … male privilege in the 
community usually becomes more entrenched” (1990: 56). Hooper has examined the 
relationship between militarism and masculinism, when demonstrating that military combat is 
a clear example of how the state propagates the ideal image of man (2001: 81). Hooper further 
affirms that it is a “popular myth that military service is the fullest expression of masculinity” 
(2001: 81). 
More importantly, the contextualization of the relationship between militarism and 
masculinity is defined by the use of Young’s conception, which implies that there is a 
homogeneous set of characteristics measured by the readiness to die for the nation (2003: 6). 
As Stiehm puts it: 
 
The protector cannot achieve status simply through his accomplishment, then. Because he has 
dependents he is as socially connected as one who is dependent. He is expected to provide for 
others. Often a protector tries to get help from and also control the lives of those he protects— 
in order to “better protect” them. (Stiehm, 1982: 372) 
 
Such nationalized masculinity elevates militarism, sacrifice and heroism, which are consistent 
with gender hierarchy, domination and exclusion. This propagation of “masculinist protection” 
that signifies the state’s mobilization of the notion of war is “associated with the position of 
male head of household as a protector of the family, and, by extension, with masculine leaders 
and risk takers as protectors of a population” (Young, 2003: 3). In the Arab-Syrian 
context, the logic of masculine protection emanates from the dominating role that masculinity 
perpetuates, and in turn this dominating masculine model of the male acts to control women’s 
sexuality under the pretext of logicalizing protection (as will be explored in Syrian laws). 
Relating Young’s conception of masculine protection to Baˈathism reveals the 
correlation between masculinism and militarism. This espousal sets the identification of the 
ideals of the citizen-warrior and Baˈathi militant, which in turn underlies the juxtaposition 
between citizenship and Baˈathism on the one hand and physical power, strength and 
manliness on the other. Ahlbäck illustrates the definitions of the concepts of manhood and 
manliness, stating that manhood becomes normalized by soldiering, while “manliness became 
associated with discipline, heroism, death and sacrifice in battle” (2016: 9). At the same time, 
these models also shape the boundaries of citizenship, as will be explored in my analysis of 
the Constitution, which centers on a version of the heroic Baˈathi warrior who becomes a 
citizen only if he conforms to the ethos of militarism. 
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 • Patriarchal protection 
This propagation of gendered logic of protection is not only incarnated by gratifying the role 
of the army in the state, but is also further measured by women’s relationship to the state. This 
leads us to the second theoretical category identified by masculinity: citizenship. While copious 
feminist analyses demonstrate that the state “is in almost all cases male dominated, and is in 
different ways a masculinist construct” (Pettman, 1996: 5), defining citizenship is correlated 
with understanding the role of the state as a masculine protector. Syria as a sovereign state 
monopolizes the conceptions of how women are politically defined and constituted. Belonging 
to such a Baˈathist state requires affiliation with military and masculinist values (Author, 2015; 
2016). Adopting Pettman’s conception of women’s relationship to citizenship, she states that 
citizenship is about “politics of exclusion, where belonging for some is marked apart from and 
depends on others’ not belonging” (1996: 16). This conception of citizenship premised on 
exclusion leads us to look at Pettman’s question of “what makes it so hard for women to 
become full citizens?” (1996: 19). This is not to argue that Syrian women are not de jure 
citizens, but the question is how women’s citizenship is defined by controlling their bodies and 
sexuality, and even legitimizing violence in the name of protection. Hence, in this paper 
citizenship is analyzed by evaluating women’s relationship to the state and measuring its 
masculinist construct as a male protector. 
This brings us to other modes of subjugation that masculinity reinforces in women’s 
relationship to the state – patriarchy. Despite this coming in a variety of forms that can prevail 
in the public and private spheres (see Walby, 1990), for the purpose of this study the use of the 
notion of patriarchy is confined to the familial domain that symbolizes the “father rule” 
(Bradley, 1989: 55). On the relationship between patriarchy and citizenship, Walby argues that 
citizenship is about “a transition from private to public patriarchy” in which women become 
trapped by deeply rooted patriarchized notions of what defines their relationship to the state 
(Walby, 1994: 379). In this paper, patriarchy coupled with masculine protection will form the 
basis of defining who becomes a citizen. Becoming a “citizen” means that members of the state 
share common characteristics of fairness and equality; making citizenship a “unifying 
symbol, and an intellectual understanding of social integration” (ibid). In this paper, 
patriarchal protection will be manifested in the state’s paternalistic control of women, and will 
therefore be explored in the analysis of Syrian laws, particularly matters related to penal law, 
honor killing and nationality. 
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• Baˈath Ideology (1920s–1950s): Theoretical Overview 
While there is a plethora of studies centered on the politics of the Baˈath Party (see Devlin, 
1976; Drysdale, 1981: 3–30; Jabbur, 1978; Abu Jaber, 1966), they leave other important topics 
such as masculinism in Baˈath ideology underdeveloped. In reviewing the scholarly debates on 
the idea of Baˈathism, this section revisits the conceptions and ideas of the Baˈath in its early 
formation as an ideology in the works of its three founding fathers: al-Husri, Aflaq and al- 
Arsuzi. 
While belonging to different racial backgrounds and religious denominations, al-Husri, 
Aflaq and al-Arsuzi have been depicted as ideologues of secular nationalism. I begin with al- 
Husri, as he has been widely considered one of the “better known exponents” (Karpat, 1968: 
28) of secular nationalism, and his nationalist legacy appealed to Aflaq and al-Arsuzi as 
Baˈathist ideologues. The influence of his writings cannot be underestimated in terms of the 
ideological construction of the Baˈath Party (Tibi, 1997: 203; Khadduri, 1970: 205). More 
specifically, Adib-Moghaddam argues that al-Husri’s nationalist thought not only influenced 
Aflaq and al-Arsuzi, but was later “institutionalised” in the Baˈath party in Syria (2006: 18; see 
also Salem, 1994: 49). 
In this paper, the construction of masculinism in the writings of Baˈath ideologues will 
be examined by investigating how these thinkers have reinforced militarism and logicalized 
masculine protection in their national theorizations. For if the works that form the basis of 
Syrian national thought continue to reflect, maintain and reinforce the unequal position of 
women, I must investigate how their conceptions are inherently connected with the idea that 




Al-Husri is the father of secular nationalism and extensively debated the origin of the idea of 
nation and nationalism in his works (1959: 31; 1964: 15–16; 1985a: 15-16). His nationalist 
theory constitutes the basis of the Baˈath ideology in Syria. An overview of his works will 
reveal his normalization of militarism which forms the basic identification of the Baˈath 
ideology later endorsed by Baˈath founders (Aflaq and al-Arsuzi) and Hafez al-Assad 
(Hinnebusch, 2001). In this section, I analyze al-Husri’s nationalist ideas with particular 
reference to the role of the army and men in defining national belonging and identity. 
The masculinization of al-Husri’s national ideology can be explicitly traced in his use 
of masculine terms to refer to his audience. While it could be argued that this was common 
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practice among nationalists in the 1950s, this gender specification accepts gender hierarchy 
and exclusion. In the introduction to his book Ṣafahāt min al-Māḍī al-Qarīb (Pages of the 
Recent Past), al-Husri indicates that its republication is “of great benefit to young men 
[shabāb]3 of the ‘present’ and to the mature men [rijāl]4 of the ‘recent future’” (1948: 7). These 
words reflect al-Husri’s intention to instill a sense of collectivity through the use of masculine 
terms. Using masculinized terminology in relation to the past and the future generates  bias 
against women  in nationalist discourse. Al-Husri proceeds in this book to call for a revival of 
the past by creating a glorious present. The problem is that his concept of a glorious present 
and future is identified with empowering men and urging them to generate the “spirit of 
sacrifice and victory” while urging them not to spread the “spirit of discontent, despair and 
surrender” (1948: 70). Within this context, al-Husri vigorously urges “young men” and 
“mature men” to join martial forces. He viewed such groups as determined by military power 
and physical strength essential to regain the glory of the nation (1948: 61–2); becoming a real 
man was measured by being ready to die for the nation and being equipped with martial force 
(1948: 63). 
What follows in this book is an exaltation of death and sacrifice associated with the 
great deeds carried out by men. In his conclusion, al-Husri defines life as synonymous with 
courageous death, which reasserts manhood and challenges potency: “I must say without any 
hesitation that life is a struggle [nidal] and a fight [qital], in every sense of the word: this 
requires death and annihilation for a lot of things” (1948: 112). This celebration of men’s 
sacrifices attempts to measure national belonging by physical strength. This in turn exposes al- 
Husri’s construction of national ideology as intimately linked with constructing the ideal man 
of the nation. It becomes very clear that al-Husri conceptualizes the nation’s realization of glory 
with man’s own achievement of manhood and masculinity (1985a: 27). 
Central to al-Husri’s conception of national belonging is men’s ability to protect the 
nation’s glory (majd), which in turn masculinizes the sense of national belonging. Such 
masculinist construct is evidenced as al-Husri declares that preserving the nation’s glory is 
directed by maternal love (1985a: 27–9). This portrayal of national love reflects the 
patriarchization of the man–woman relationship that is based on subordination and coercion. 
According to al-Husri, it is this nationalistic and patriotic love that will awaken sentiments in 
people to struggle and sacrifice for national glory and unity: 
We must remember that the nationalist idea enjoys a self-motivating power; it is a driving 
impulse to action and struggle. When it enters the mind and dominates the soul, it is one of the 
forces that awakens the people [al-shaʿb] and inspires them to sacrifice. (1951: 238–9) 
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 From these words, we can derive a picture of an overwhelmingly masculinist representation 
 that conceptualizes readiness to fight as a main characteristic that defines national belonging 
through further idealizing physical sacrifice. It is related to the question of who are the 
“people” (al-shaʿb) who may be connoted with the characteristics of “action” and “struggle”. 
Moreover, it must be recognized that al-Husri’s use of the term shubbān (young men) is an 
affirmation of the superiority of men as the only believers in the nation. Hence, this 
juxtaposition between the assertion of nationalistic faith and the ability to sacrifice for the 
national struggle subsequently defines the concept of belonging (1985b: 40). 
Another important feature in al-Husri’s theorization is his emphasis on the role of the 
army in instilling national identity. He argued that militarism should be part of the education 
system (1985a: 450). On one level, al-Husri’s perception sustains an exclusionary narrative of 
how girls should be educated. Militarism effectively becomes a means of defining and 
maintaining group identity and affiliation: the army, representing the nation, structures the 
politics of inclusion and exclusion in the national community. This belonging and 
membership is best understood in the readiness to die for the nation, fostering a commitment 
to “militarised and continuously politicised conception of life, a conception that is entirely 
masculinist” (Kateb, 2006: 8). Moreover, the glory of the nation, like the glory of a man, is 
measured in terms of heroism and militarism. Women therefore become part of this national 
discourse that their status is conditioned by the state’s imposed national ideology, and 
(sometimes) their image is propagated as naturally passive while men are conceived as active 
participants in the national struggle. 
  
Michel Aflaq 
Michel Aflaq (1910–1989) was a Syrian philosopher, sociologist and nationalist thinker, 
perceived to be the political founder of Baˈathist thought. He published various books during 
his lifetime; the most notable collection of his nationalist ideology is found in the five-
volume work Fı̄ Sabı̄l al-Baˈath (On the Way of Resurrection).1(please use endnotes as per 
JMEWS guidelines) Born into a middle-class family in Damascus, he studied at the 
Sorbonne, where he was exposed to European philosophers and Germanic and French 
nationalist traditions. He returned to Syria in 1932 equipped with his political ideas on the 
future. His influential role in constructing Syrian national thought can be traced back to 1947, 
when the first congress of the Baˈath Party was held in Damascus (Rabinovich, 1972: 228), 
                                                     
1 This work includes most of Aflaq’s lectures, articles, speeches and conferences roughly between the 1930s and the 1970s. Full access to this work 
can be found online at http://albaath.online.fr/. Any reference to Aflaq’s work will be from this website, unless noted that it is from the printed 
version. 
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with him positioned as the “leader” of the party (Moubayed, 2006: 131). The basis of his 
nationalist ideology sprung from al-Husri’s conception of nationalism and the two European 
schools of nationalist thought.  
The political philosophy of Michel Aflaq has long been studied as the theory that 
contributes most to the establishment of the political system in Syria (see El-Attrache, 1976).5 
Aflaq’s militant conception of Baˈathism is best examined by deconstructing the national 
concepts and language in his iconic work Fī Sabīl al-Baʿath (Towards the Resurrection). This 
subsection provides an analysis of Aflaq’s emphasis on the construction of national identity 
as measured by constructing the ideal image of the Baˈathist man. Contextualizing his 
conception of Baˈathism, Aflaq’s speeches propose the image of manhood as the only 
representative of the ideal human being. In a more explicit encouragement of “young men” 
(shabāb) to join the Baˈath, Aflaq distinguishes between “revolutionary men” and men who 
are still outside the party. This distinction not only refers to the basic Baˈathist ideology as “a 
movement from dark to light” (which is exclusively defined by men’s participation in the 
Baˈath), but it is also a masculinist call for a particular type of men: those who show 
readiness for sacrifice and the protectection of the nation. As the title, Tharwat al-Ḥayāt 
(Treasure of Life), makes clear, this 1936 
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speech is addressed to men as the only ones who give life its meaning through their 
participation in the national struggle. In a separate article, Aflaq states that “between our nation 
and our men, there is chemistry, appointment, and a meeting” (1955). In a more transparent 
articulation of his sentiments, he states that men’s activism and impulsion is what the nation 
needs: “They are the rescuers” (ibid). 
Aflaq’s politics of Baˈathism entail submission to the scheme of a solidarist life. He 
emphasizes the image of the nation as a community born out of solidarity between patriots; the 
nation is composed only of those who embody the “national idea” (1944). The related question 
is: how does the nation preserve its identity? Aflaq encourages a sense of belonging among 
those who internalize the national cause in their souls and are therefore committed to sacrifice 
themselves and die for the nation; those “who are aware of themselves and their individuality, 
and not that distorted, abnormal minority who are in denial of their national role” (1950). In 
fact, Aflaq specifies the membership of this imagined majority to be exclusively male patriots. 
This implementation of struggle, sacrifice and suffering as national themes, which are equated 
with manhood and hegemonic masculinity, is central to Aflaq’s definition of national 
belonging. Even in the 1940s, by which time al-Baˈath was established as a political party, 
Aflaq states that the value of having “faith in the Baˈath” has been confined to our “Arab men” 
(al-shabāb al-ʿarabī). Moreover, this faith is conceptualized as a means to “transcend partition 
through pain … and struggle” (1943). 
There is a need to illuminate how Aflaq understood the Baˈath message, which is 
defined in his speech “hawla al-risālah al-ʾArabīyah” (About the Arab Message) (1946) as, 
 
“a belief before anything else … it precedes any practical knowledge … It is the nation … and 
it is the right of all individuals [’afrād] to aspire to chivalry [al-murūʾa] and heroism [al-butūla] 
… However, it should be noted that, although it is required that each one should aspire to 
heroism, not all people are heroic [alʾbtāl].” (1946) 
 
While Aflaq’s narrative appears to be inclusive in his reference to “all individuals” (’afrād) 
rather than shabāb (men), the correlation between accomplishing one’s individuality and one’s 
national role can still only be achieved through heroism and chivalry and their juxtaposition 
with the construction of masculinity. As al-murūʾa (chivalry) stands for “perfect manhood”, it 
further reinforces an essentialist correlation between manliness and the construction of ideal 
national identity. The construction of this coupling manifested in the two words “heroism” 
and “chivalry” denotes a presumption of a masculinist national conception. 
Another example that highlights his preoccupation with the construction of an ideal 
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Baˈathist identity is a speech delivered in 1975 titled “al-Baˈathi hwa al-surah al-haqiqīyah li 
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lūmmah” (Al-Baˈathi is the Living Image of the Nation). He stressed the reformulation of the 
Baˈathist national identity as the “only reflection of the New Arab” still based on the “activity” 
of its “militants/fighters” (monadilīn). In his definition of the “character of the Baˈathi”, he 
identifies ideal manhood through “sacrifice and patriotism.” In his words: “the living image of 
the Baˈath and the nation can only be embodied by the militant Baˈathi … he is the living image 
of past and future … of heritage, authenticity, progress and creativity” (1975, emphasis added). 
According to Aflaq, what determines the identity of an ideal Baˈathi is being a male active 
fighter ready to die to protect the nation. 
 
Zaki al-Arsuzi 
Zaki al-Arsuzi was born to an Alawite family, marginalised during the reign of the Ottoman 
Empire. His father’s political activism against the Ottomans shaped al-Arsuzi’s political 
passion in nationalist ideologies (Watenpaugh, 1996: 365). During his stay in France between 
1927 and 1930, he was exposed to both French culture and European philosophy (Choueiri, 
2001: 144). This attraction to French ideals might be attributed to his excellence in speaking 
French and to studying at the Sorbonne. He returned to Syria in 1930 very influenced by the 
French Revolution and its principles. However, this later caused him trouble with the French 
authorities for teaching the principles of the French Revolution to his students in Syria. Al-
Arsuzi, like other nationalists at that time, therefore developed a nationalist ideology based on 
centralising the Arabic language as the primary principle for formulating the nation. Calling 
Aflaq a “thief” of his nationalist ideology, the “Baˈath” (see Curtis, 1977), al-Arsuzi was less 
popular than Afalq and al-Husri, perhaps because he lacked the conventional style of al-
Husri’s nationalist narrative and Aflaq’s ardent voice in his speeches. 
Following Aflaq and al-Husri, al-Arsuzi conceptualizes national belonging as 
preceding any philosophical or theoretical knowledge (1973: 341), which means that national 
love is unconditional and involuntary. He believed the nation is not only an extension of the 
family from “a spiritual perspective”, but the resemblance between the family and the nation 
also lies in the duties assigned to the “brothers” (ˈikhwān) of the nation (1973: 344). This 
suggests that, in both the family and the nation, men are considered sovereign, leaders and, 
therefore, superior. This patriarchization of nation and family creates a hierarchical order 
between men and women. 
Al-Arsuzi argued that the family has a significant role in nation formation, and for this 
reason he considers it synonymous with “humanity”. However, the “evolution of the family 
towards superior humanity” (1973: 305) is based on controlling women’s choices of their future 
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husbands. In this context, al-Arsuzi considers controlling woman’s sexuality as essential for 
 formulating a nation of a superior race. Notwithstanding his claim that his doctrine is not 
based on race, when it comes to a woman’s freedom to choose her partner al-Arsuzi 
adamantly justifies full control over her choices (1973: 305). 
Given the hierarchical structure of al-Arsuzi’s conception of family and the nation, it 
can be discerned that a woman’s chastity is another masculinist construction used and justified 
to control women’s choices. Using somewhat racist language, al-Arsuzi articulates his view 
that a child born to mixed-race marriages is a “disgusting” (muqrif) “half-caste” (hajīn) (1973: 
307). This proposal for the regulation of marriage and breeding reflects the priority of 
maintaining the purity of the race in constituting the natural boundaries of the nation. 
In this argument, the woman is regarded solely as a means for breeding a superior race 
only if married to local men. In this sense, it is only logical to presume that al-Arsuzi’s anti- 
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miscegenetic views are at the root of depriving Syrian women of the right to pass citizenship 
to their children if they marry non-Syrians (as will be explored later). 
Al-Arsuzi’s emphasis on the significance of painting the ideal “image of the Arab 
family” by constructing a hierarchical order within it (1973: 307) is coupled with conceiving 
that the family is natural; in other words, al-Arsuzi implies that its existence is pivotal for the 
satisfaction of the man. This is reflected in his argument that the man is naturally “superior to 
the woman” in the formation of the family (1973: 307). Interestingly, al-Arsuzi further 
attributes the superiority of the father in the family to the philological source of the term “ˈābb” 
(father) and its similarity to the pronunciation of the English word “up”, and therefore 
concludes that the word “father” in Arabic symbolizes “highness” (iʿtilāʾ) and “eruption” 
(haiajān) (1973: 308). Al-Arsuzi justifies this linguistic association with the superior role of 
the man in controlling the private sphere. 
 
Formation of the Baˈath state 
Throughout its modern history, Syria has been subject to several military coups (inqilabat) that 
further epitomize the role of the army in the country’s formation. Exploring Syria’s turbulent 
history, most scholars have debated these military coups in relation to the country’s future of 
democracy and freedom (Hinnebusch, 2001: 18). However, no research is concerned with 
asking what makes militarism so pivotal in the formulation of Syria as a modern nation-state. 
This brings us to the history of Syria following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the need for 
self-determination that made the region aspire to victory through military power. Thus, to 
investigate how Baˈath ideology and the early formation of the Baˈath state have shaped 
women’s relationship to citizenship in Syria, this section will explore important historical and 
political background to the drafting of first permanent Syrian Constitution and Syrian laws. 
To understand the evolution of Baˈathism from its theoretical origin to its practical 
application, we need to understand the use of military power as a tool for consolidating the rule 
of Hafez al-Assad. The development of the Baˈath Party throughout the 1960s into an 
increasingly militaristic establishment began after the re-establishment of the Baˈath in 1962. 
The Military Committee toppled the infisal regime in a military coup on 8 March 1963, an act 
supported by even the civilian leadership of the party, displaying the increased tolerance of 
military methods. In 1966, Assad set out to strengthen his position in the government through 
key military appointments (Mann, 2006: 769). His success meant that, by 1969, through the 
appointment of confidants in the military, the radicals were reduced to “control of the party 
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apparatus”, with Assad maintaining a firm grip on the army (Galvani, 1974: 11). With the 
rivalry climaxing within the party during the Black September crisis of 1970, when the regime 
sent divisions to help the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Assad launched the 
Corrective Movement on 30 October 1970, with loyalist troops arresting members of Jadid’s 
government, ousting the radical regime and installing his supporters in the Baˈath Regional 
Command. Ultimately, the internal conflict within the Baˈath Party from 1963 to 1970 showed 
that whoever controlled the military controlled the government, with Assad reigning supreme 
and rising to the presidency. 
 
Drafting the permanent Syrian Constitution 
Despite playing a central role in formulating the nation-state, the army alone was not enough 
for the modernization of Syria; rather, the early formation of the nation-state includes an 
institutionalization of constitutional legitimacy imposed from above (Hinnebusch, 2008). To 
borrow Hinnebusch’s words, the creation of Syria as a state is like “a ‘Bonapartist’ regime – a 
postrevolutionary authoritarian regime standing ‘above’ classes and presiding over the 
formation of a strong new state” (1989: 30). This stage (state formation) of Syrian history, the 
1970s, marks the ascendance of the Baˈath regime with its primary focus on the process of 
developing state institutions as the best way to modernize Syria (Trentin, 2009: 497; Kienle, 
1995: 67). This interest by the Baˈath regime in promoting state institutions “increased the 
degree to which citizens interacted and identified with their state” (Gilbert, 2013: 32). Thus, in 
an epoch concerned with strengthening the localization of Syria as inherently both legitimate 
and sovereign, the shift from the theoretical ideology of the Baˈath to the politicization of the 
Baˈath Party as the leading political party in Syria concentrated on militarizing the state. 
According to Hinnebusch, the consolidation of the Baˈath state is a “product of a nationalist 
party and an army radicalised by the conflict with Israel, developed under Hafiz al-Asad [sic] 
into a huge national security apparatus designed to confront Israel” (2001:138). 
More than 15 constitutions have been issued in Syria since its foundation as a modern 
state in 1920. The volatility of the constitution in the Syrian context stems from the frequent 
military coups that issued them as a tool of legitimacy. In this political context, this evolution 
of Baˈath ideology resulted in the realization of Syria’s political sovereignty, through which 
the state strove to legitimize its existence by drafting the first permanent Constitution in 1973 
under the strong guidance of Hafez al-Assad during a state of emergency. 
The permanent Constitution enacted in 1973 is the most important because it marks a 
turning point in Syrian history as it was the first to institutionalize and legitimize the Baˈath 
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ideology in Syria. This is evident in Article 8, which stipulates the Baˈath Party as the sole 
“leading party in the society and the state”. Such imposed authority given to the Baˈath Party 
not only legitimizes but also institutionalizes Baˈathist ideals and values. As discussed earlier, 
the Baˈath ideology is based on perpetuating militarism and masculine protection as 
prerequisites for defining national belonging and identity. In this context, having explored the 
basic ethos and values of Baˈathism in its theoretical part, and contextualized the historical and 
political background to the formulation of both the Baˈath state and the permanent Constitution, 
Part II looks at how Baˈath ideology has been implemented and reinforced in the Constitution 
and laws. The analysis will look mainly at how militarism and masculinism maintain and 
reinforce a subordinate status in designating women’s relationship to the state.6 
 
Part II 
Militarized Belonging in the Constitution’s Preamble 
The preamble of a constitution is often designed to frame the general spirit of the constitutional 
community by enacting the major principles that define membership of the state. Hence, it is 
necessary to start with the Preamble of the Syrian Constitution to understand how the major 
principles of national identity have been framed and structured. Thus, the Preamble reflects the 
dominance of propagated national elements, such as will and determination, struggle and 
sacrificial heroism (Author, 2016; 2017a; 2017b). The constitutional narrative is connoted with 
constructing the ideal image of the Baˈathi man. These elements are full of references to ideal 
masculinism and heroism that reinforce male privilege in both state and society. 
As an “executive summary” of what the founding fathers were hoping to achieve 
through the Constitution (Irving, 2008: 15), the Preamble also acts as a preliminary statement 
of its general goals. This brings us to the imposed national narrative premised on heroism, 
manliness and struggle as the basis for constituting the Syrian national identity. Such primacy 
of idealizing manhood and struggle in the opening statement of the Constitution leads us to 
question how Syrian women are symbolically perceived within it. The early part of the 
Preamble reads: 
With the close of the first half of this century, the Arab people’s struggle has been expanding 
and assuming greater importance in various countries to achieve liberation from direct 
colonialism. The Arab masses did not regard independence as their goal and the end of their 
sacrifices, but as a means to consolidate their struggle, and as an advanced phase in their 
continuing battle against the forces of imperialism, Zionism, and exploitation under the 
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leadership of their patriotic and progressive forces in order to achieve the Arab nation’s goals 
of unity, freedom, and socialism. (SC) 
It can be deduced from this that the repeated use of the generic terms “people” and “masses” 
is by default exclusivist of women and continues to situate women outside the national realm 
(Rosenfeld, 2012: 757). In the Syrian context, the question of gender in the construction of 
constitutional identity combines textual sameness that is evidenced by using generic terms in 
substitution for the human being. Moreover, the construction of a distinctive macho identity 
based on perpetuating the narrative of struggle, heroism and sacrifice establishes a contrasting 
sense of selfhood derived from maleness. Identifying “sacrifice” for the nation  with 
masculinist protection, the “self” in this narrative is conceived as the normalized manliness, 
while the “other” is the subservient female. Such hierarchical division of gender roles is 
substituted with the authorial invocation of “people”, “masses” and “citizens” in the 
Constitution, which provokes questions of how these terms supposedly create an abstract 
homogeneous identity, and further reinforces the model of “masculinist protection” based on 
heroism and sacrifice. 
This neutrality in the Preamble through the use of generic terms is further consolidated 
in the association between the notion of “struggle” and the “sacrifice” of the “people” and 
“masses”.7 The first dominant notion in the Preamble is struggle, signifying the need for 
masculine protection, which will be used as a tool to delineate gender boundaries in the national 
imagination and further reinforces the masculinization of popular will. This raises the question 
of whether the invocation of popular struggle in the Preamble is a characterization only of 
men’s heroic deeds. Moreover, as a popular construct it further questions whether the use of 
seemingly gender-neutral terms such as “citizens” and “people” includes women in the 
constitutional community. To answer these questions, we need to interrogate both the use of 
language in the Preamble and whether the notion of struggle is connoted with masculinist traits 
and ethos. 
This identification of heroic sacrifice and struggle continues to maintain the idealist 
construction of masculinist protection and militarist values that have already been perpetuated 
in the Baˈath ideology. What facilitates such provisions is the weight placed in the Preamble 
on the “party’s militant struggle”. This emphasis on militaristic values can be seen in the 
following words: 
 
In the Syrian Arab region, the masses [jamahīr] of our people [shaˈab] continued their struggle 
after independence. Through their progressive march they were able to achieve their big victory 
by setting off the revolution of 8 March 1963 under the leadership of the Socialist Arab Baath 
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Party, which has made authority an instrument to serve the struggle for the construction of the 
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United Socialist Arab society. The Socialist Arab Baath Party is the first movement in the Arab 
homeland which gives Arab unity its sound revolutionary meaning, connects the nationalist 
with the socialist struggle, and represents the Arab nation’s will and aspirations for a future that 
will bind the Arab nation with its glorious past and will enable it to carry out its role in achieving 
victory for the cause of freedom of all the peoples. (SC, emphasis added) 
 
This wording highlights some of the fundamental values and main principles on which the 
Constitution is based. The politicized national element of Syrian national identity, such as will 
and determination, is clearly invoked. Thus, the invocation of the popular will of “the people” 
at the beginning of the Preamble expands the sovereignty of the Constitution. However, this 
reference to the popular will is based, rather, on the readiness to die for the nation, which is 
conceptualized in association with measures of masculine prowess. This in turn questions the 
precise definitions of who “the people” are. In turn, it must be said that the concept of 
“struggle” (Kifah) and “will” (ˈiradat), which were already perpetuated in Baˈath ideology, are 
further institutionalized in the Preamble. 
The Preamble reinforces a commitment to the construction of ideal heroism and virility, 
and propagates the conceptualization of history as a male construct. More importantly, while 
this quote from the Preamble expresses a transcendent authority by asserting that “the masses 
of our people” in Syria have authorized the leadership of the Socialist Arab Baˈath Party, the 
irony of such a declaration is that the so-called “revolution” of March 1963 was a military 
coup, and so questions the genuine inclusion of women. In this sense, this wording binds the 
concept of “revolutionary” struggle with the renunciation of the glorious past. This amounts to 
an implicit symbolization of masculinist virility. Furthermore, it involves perpetuation of the 
logic of masculinist protection. Hence, history is given further legal and political authority 
through the invocations of masculinized heroic glory in Syria’s first permanent constitution. 
The Preamble further justifies the end means of militant struggle and claims that the 
party’s militant struggle reflects popular demands and aspirations: 
 
Through the party's militant struggle, the 16 Nov 1970 corrective movement responded to our 
people's demands and aspirations. This corrective movement was an important qualitative 
development and a faithful reflection of the party's spirit, principles, and objectives. (SC, 
emphasis added) 
 
These words further highlight the espousal of militarism and logic of masculinist protection. 
The imposed authority given to the Baˈath Party in its militaristic nature to exercise supreme 
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judicial, legislative and executive power in Syria denotes the absence of any plural and 
democratic system that can enhance women’s political mobilization towards promoting equal 
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rights and representation. Furthermore, Article 23(3) emphasizes the association of the role of 
education with building a physically strong body, which subsequently emphasizes the 
construction of a male protector: 
 
Physical education is a foundation for the building of society. The state encourages physical 
education to form a physically, mentally, and morally strong generation. (SC) 
 
This notion of education is synonymous with glorifying militarism. The recognition of the vital 
role of youth in nation-building promotes the inculcation of patriotism, masculine protection 
and heroism. The primacy of forming a physically strong generation cannot but be attributed 
to Article 11, in which the role of defending the homeland is restricted to military forces. In 
the same vein, it must be noted that the word order is highly reflective of the privilege given to 
physical strength as superior to mental and moral strength. It is justifiable to ask why forming 
a physically strong generation is stressed, rather than referring to a healthy generation mentally, 
morally and physically. In fact, the choice of the adjective “strong” (qawi) is in line with the 
masculinist construction of the concept of citizenship based on readiness to protect the nation. 
One can say that the concept of citizenship reinforced in the Constitution relies heavily on 
physical strength; in turn, militarism is intimately linked with realizing the ideal image of 
Baˈathi man. In other words, this continuation of sanctifying physical strength to sharpen the 
image of the Syrian warrior becomes intertwined with national belonging. 
Contextualizing “struggle”, “sacrifice” and “glorious past”, which are reinforced in the 
Preamble, constructs a constitutional identity associated with manhood and strives to create a 
continuing image of a militant identity. More importantly, this declaration of the militant 
struggle very early in the Constitution excludes women’s struggle against colonial and imperial 
domination. As Enloe declares, “militarisation puts a premium on communal unity in the name 
of national survival, a priority which can silence women critical of patriarchal practices and 
attitudes; in so doing, nationalist militarisation can privilege men” (1990: 57–8). 
The ambiguity of how women are conceived in the Constitution can be detected in the 
major principles outlined in the Preamble. The Preamble declares that 
4) Freedom is a sacred right and popular democracy is the ideal formulation which insures for 
the citizen the exercise of his freedom which makes him a dignified human being capable of 
giving and building, defending the homeland in which he lives, and making sacrifices for the 
sake of the nation to which he belongs. The homeland’s freedom can only be preserved by its 
free citizens. The citizen’s freedom can be completed only by his economic and social 
liberation. (SC) 
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As previously argued, the Preamble constitutes the general framework of the national identity 
subjected to the legalization of this Constitution. While these words virtually support freedom 
and democracy equally, the use of some apparently gender-neutral nouns still questions 
women’s inclusion. This linguistically obscure use of the masculine reference is juxtaposed 
with the concept of sacredness. This is somewhat restricted to the association between sacrifice 
and belonging that incorporates the logic of masculinist protection and the militarization of 
society, which subsequently intensifies the existing notions of privileging masculinity and 
manhood. In other words, this “sacred” right of freedom is intimately linked with “defending 
the homeland”, and within this context one might ask whether this call is at all gender-inclusive. 
This leads us to Article 11 of the Constitution, which declares that only “[t]he armed 
forces and other defense organizations are responsible for the defense of the homeland’s 
territory and for the protection of the revolution’s objectives of unity, freedom, and socialism” 
(SC). Moreover, in Syria the military is a conscripted force; males serve two years upon 
reaching the age of 18. This glorification of manliness, intimately linked with citizenship and 
directly connected to both militarism and hegemony, is highlighted by Hooper: 
The associations between military service, masculinity, and citizenship have been strong in the 
modern era. Soldiering is characterised as a manly activity requiring the “masculine” traits of 
physical strength, action, toughness [and] capacity for violence. (2001: 36–7) 
This revelation further sustains the ambiguous status of women in respect of their right to 
freedom and democracy and whether they will ever realize their humanity and full citizenship. 
In the same vein, the conceptualization of freedom and humanity is discursively constructed 
by stressing sacrifice through socializing militarism. The relationship between freedom and the 
ability to protect the nation invites the question whether the term “citizen” at all entitles women 
to full national membership. It is important to make clear that the Preamble establishes a nexus 
between freedom and humanity, when it states that the “citizen” exercises “his freedom which 
makes him a dignified human being capable of … defending the homeland … and making 
sacrifices for the sake of the nation to which he belongs” (SC). This construction of a unified 
perception of citizenship consolidates the overlap between the ability to protect the homeland 
on the one hand and freedom, humanity and manhood on the other. 
This overlap between constitutional membership, masculinist protection and militarism 
is further stressed in Article 40 in Part 4 (Freedom, Rights, Duties) of Chapter 1 (Basic 
Principles), which constitutes two sacred rights: 
(1) All citizens have the sacred duty to defend the homeland’s security, to respect its 
Constitution and socialist unionist system. 
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(2) Military service is compulsory and regulated by law. 
(SC, emphasis added) 
More remarkably, defining the defense of the homeland as a “sacred duty” for “all citizens” 
refers to the ambiguity of the choice of terms in specifying the gender of these citizens. Adding 
to the subtlety of this article, the second paragraph implicitly limits the presumed gender- 
inclusive duty of all citizens in defending the homeland to men in compulsory military service. 
This constitutes an overlap between the construction of masculinism and the perception of 
equality in constitutional membership between men and women. In this context, the 
contextualization of men’s privilege to defend the homeland with sacredness consecrates a 
symbolic hierarchy and domination of one gender over the other. Pettman points out that the 
exclusion of women in the state may be related to the “close associations of citizenship with 
bearing arms and being prepared to kill or die for the state” (1996: 17). Moreover, Elshtain 
refers to the “militarisation of citizenship” where women are depicted as “weeper[s] over the 
tragedies” of war, and men as protectors and guardians of the dependent and submissive women 
(1985: 42). 
Given the foregoing, surveying the Preamble sets out the general national narrative of 
the Constitution, which has designated the concept of struggle, will and heroic sacrifice as the 
most definitive features of constitutional membership. Thus, the characterization of women 
perpetuates conceptions of their lack of suitability to become full citizens. The reinforcement 
of masculinized identity so early in the Constitution questions presumed gender-inclusive 
terms such as “people” and “masses” being juxtaposed with enforced military conscription. 
The problem lies not in conscription per se, but in the ambiguous use of “citizens” to refer to 
men in the military and to the conceptualization of defending the homeland as sacred and 
associated with human dignity. This link between military service, masculinist protection and 
citizenship constructs a hierarchical categorization in the Constitution that perpetuates gender 
boundaries in Syrian laws. 
 
The State as a Male Protector 
 
Patriarchal Protection: Defining Citizenship 
The logic of masculine protection can be clearly traced to how national membership in Syria 
is still paternal. Further evidence of this subjugation of women is the failure to perceive them 
as legal citizens equal to men. Again, the Constitution fails in its commitment to see women as 
political persons endowed with rights guaranteed by the state. This is quite clear in Article 43, 
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which states: “The law regulates Syrian Arab citizenship and guarantees special facilities for 
the Syrian Arab expatriates and their children and for the citizens of the Arab countries”. 
Under this provision, the law is responsible for regulating citizenship; this regulation 
acts against Syrian women. The Syrian Nationality Act entered into force in November 1969, 
just after the Baˈath regime took power,8 demonstrates how the state discriminates against 
women. Syrian women cannot transfer their citizenship to their children or spouses if they 
marry a non-Syrian. The legislation enacting these regulations was issued in 1976, since then 
there have been no amendments. While the notion of masculinist protection in this context 
defined and mobilized by the state, in this instance masculinist protection becomes definer of  
who deserves to belong to the nation. Such discrimination stems from the perpetuation of the 
logic of masculinist protection symbolized by the state. 
 
Patriarchal Protection: Control of Maternal Rights 
Two gender-inclusive provisions in the 1973 Constitution that specifically address women 
should be highlighted: Articles 44 and 45, protecting women’s rights, family and motherhood. 
These positive measures guarantee women’s rights, yet the fact that they do not appear early 
in the Constitution still questions the seriousness of the state’s commitment to women’s 
equality. Indeed, this is somewhat contradicted by Articles 523 and 524 of the Penal Code, 
which respectively criminalize women for using contraceptive pills and vendors for selling or 
advertising them in public. This hegemonic control over a woman’s right to control her 
reproductivity highlights a particular construct of the national narrative. More importantly, 
despite these regulations on women’s choices, the Syrian Commission for Family Affairs – a 
government body enjoying the status of a legal and administrative entity – issued a new policy 
in 2008 that encourages limiting the number of children in the family (Syrian Commission for 
Family Affairs, 2008). This regulation of women’s fertility contradicts the state’s commitment 
to women’s rights in childbearing. Moreover, it is surely contradictory to penalize the use and 
sale of contraception while encouraging birth control through official means. 
The 2008 policy aims to regulate the high birth-rate in Syria. According to the First 
National Primary Policy Report on the State of Population in Syria (Syrian Commission for 
Family Affairs, 2008), the regulation of the increase in population in Syria depends on 
encouraging women to marry later and have fewer children. While this is important in order to 
enhance the development of women’s education and to work on promoting their contribution 
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to decision-making in the public sphere, mobilizing women’s right to bear children and 
considering it a government goal to decrease the rate of population growth in Syria contradicts 
Article 45 of the Constitution. The study goes on to suggest “direct policy intervention” to 
reduce the fertility rate of every woman (2008: 17). 
This contradiction between the state’s initiative to protect motherhood and to control 
women’s right to bear children ultimately limits women’s choice. Moreover, policing women’s 
sexuality indicates the state’s paternalism. In other words, these actions indicate the state’s 
role as a masculine protector that subordinates women’s choices. This contradiction between 
the Penal Code and the 2008 government project emphasizes how women’s choices become 
primary targets of masculine hegemony through the control of contraception and  
childbearing (Dwyer, 2000: 33). 
 
Patriarchal Protection: Legalizing Violence 
The state’s failure to take action over legalized violence against women under the logic of 
patriarchal and masculine protection is manifested in several penal laws discussed in what 
follows. It is important to note that the Syrian Penal Code was enacted in 1949, with French 
and Islamic laws as the major source. However, the fact that the Baˈath state in Syria has failed 
to change this law begs the question as to what extent the Baˈath ideology has, in its 
masculinist characteristics and naturalized promotion of militarism and soldiery, intensified 
and normalized the perception of women as less than equal to men. Moreover, the fact that 
these provisions were maintained despite the supposed secularity of the Baˈath state 
demonstrates how the Syrian state has monopolized public understanding of women’s 
political identity, and where the exclusive boundaries of politics are designated to legitimate 
masculine protection ethos. 
Investigation of some provisions in the Penal Code shows that the law legitimizes 
marriage based on coercion and violence.9 The logic of masculinist protection can be seen in 
Article 489, which stipulates that a rapist will be imprisoned for 21 years if the victim was 
under 15 years old and only five years she was older than 15. More related to the legitimization 
of violence based on gender are Articles 490–508, which deal with the crimes of kidnap, rape, 
violent attack and sexual manipulation of females (less and more than 15 years old). Despite 
these articles indicating that the sentence upon conviction ranges from five to 15 years, under 
Article 508 a rapist can escape punishment if he marries his victim. This perpetuates a form of 
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masculinist protection which reflects the absolute disregard for women’s rights and a 
stigmatization of women. 
Further evidence of how women’s relationship to the state is measured by masculinist 
protection can be found in the Penal Code’s failure to outlaw physical violence against women 
committed in the family. Recent studies evaluating the Penal Code and violence in Syrian 
society have shown that domestic violence is common throughout the country (Kelly & Breslin, 
2010: 461). More importantly, this domestic abuse is not specifically outlawed; for example, 
spousal rape is excluded as a punishable offence under the legal definition of rape. Article 489 
of the Penal Code stipulates that: 
 
1) The man who violently threatened a woman other than his wife to have intercourse with him 
will be punished for 15 years with hard labor. 
2) The punishment will be not less than 21 years if the victim was less than 15 years old. 
 
By omitting any reference to rape within the marital relationship, this article clearly licenses 
violence against women in the family sphere and shows the dominance of patriarchy in state 
practices. 
Similarly, the law dealing with adultery legalizes violence against women. While the 
Constitution confirms that citizens are equal before the law in their rights and duties (Article 
25(3)), the Penal Code discriminates against women in matters related to adultery. Under 
Article 473, the woman faces a sentence ranging from three months to two years on her 
conviction, while the man faces one month to one year (but only if he is married). Article 474 
stipulates that the convicted husband will receive a sentence of one month to one year if he 
commits adultery in his spousal home. This discrimination against women is not restricted to 
sentencing, but it shows how adultery is viewed differently by men and by women. Under 
Articles 473(3) and 475, men and women receive different treatment for gender-based 
violence. The man can present any kind of evidence before the judge to prove his case, 
whereas the woman must present written evidence only, such as a written confession by the 
husband. 
Despite both Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution stipulating that citizens are equal 
before the law in duties and obligations, some of the Penal Code’s provisions discriminate 
against women. This can be seen explicitly in Article 548, which stipulates that men can be 
exempted from punishment if they hurt or kill their spouse, sister or any of their descendants 
in cases where they unexpectedly discover any of these committing adultery or extramarital 
sexual relations with another man. This act of honor killing is justified by the law and 
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considered permissible on the pretext that the crime was committed in extreme anger or 
excitement or without premeditation. Article 548(2) gives the man the right to kill or hurt his 
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spouse, sister or any of his descendants if he catches them in a “suspicious situation”. The use 
of “suspicious” (mashkūk) is very vague and gives the man unlimited grounds for attack. 
Suffice to say that Article 548 justified violence against women in the private sphere 
from 1949 until 2009, when it was amended to increase the punishment of a man who kills or 
hurts his spouse or any of his descendants to (only) two years’ imprisonment (Khaizaran, 
2009). This article was amended due to the rise in the number of honor killings in Syria (533 
in 2007). However, two years’ imprisonment does not stand up to scrutiny as a punishment for 
killing a woman but, rather, normalizes a culture of gender-based violence. 
As I have explored in the previous sections, the perpetuation of militarism in the 
Ba’ath ideology has maintained a subordinate status of women in the Syrian laws. This has 




This paper seeks to unify three different areas of inquiry – masculinist protection, militarism 
and Baˈathism – to arrive at a deeper understanding of how gender bias, national identity and 
belonging have been constituted in Syria since the early 20th century. Given the geopolitical 
context of the Syrian case, the paper has answered an important question as to what Baˈathism 
is and how it is used to perpetuate masculinism. The example of Syria thus presents an 
opportunity to explore how dominant national ideology generates and endorses masculinist 
ethos and values. Although the paper is not, strictly speaking, comparative, its findings and 
insights should have relevance for other countries in the Middle East. 
This paper has engaged with the logic of masculinist protection intensified by 
militarism that dominates both the Constitution and Syrian law. Because so much of Syrian 
politics has, since the beginning of the 20th century, revolved around defense and militarism, 
this militant construction of national identity and belonging has elevated men to much more 
central roles – while women have remained marginal to the national discourse. Militarism has 
also been central in defining membership of the constitutional community. In other words, the 
concept of male sacrifice for the nation in the Baˈath ideology symbolizes a system based on 
privileging men and disempowering women. In addition, the state’s control over women’s 
sexuality imposes a complicated perception of the rights of motherhood. In the same vein, 
understanding the intricate nature of the link between Baˈathism and the logic of masculinist 
protection and militarism that prevails in the Preamble of the Constitution reflects the 
hegemonic patriarchy in the state-formation stage. Such a construction of virile manliness 
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explains why Baˈathism has failed, despite its nominal secularity, to break with tradition when 
it comes to women’s rights. 
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Consequently, it must be said that the birth of the nation-state in Syria has been marked 
by a dominant nationalist narrative that homogenizes a definitive construction of masculinist 
protection. The subordination of political authority to militarism at the start of the Constitution 
structurally burdens women in terms of their incomplete political personhood. Using this 
approach, this paper reveals how investigating Baˈath ideology and contextualizing the 
militaristic background to the early formation of the Baˈath state explains women’s subordinate 
status in Syrian laws. Because much legal analysis is based on particular conceptions of 
tradition, religion and patriarchy, interrogating the perpetuation of masculinist protection in 
national ideologies can change how the Constitution and laws are interpreted and applied. 
 
 
1 The English-language version of the 1973 Syrian Constitution referenced in this thesis is retrieved from the 
website of the Carnegie Middle East Center: http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en. References to 
extracts from this version are cited as “(SC)”. As a native speaker, I find that the content and spirit of the Arabic 
version of the Constitution are maintained in this version. 
2 This slogan was drummed into us in all the mass marches. 
3 This word is often used in Arabic to refer to young men, presumably from the age of 18 to their mid-thirties. 
4 This word is used to refer to mature men, between 35 and 55. 
5 A thorough study of Aflaq’s political philosophy finds that it is almost the only study to dedicate so much 
attention to his national concepts, although it does not address the question of women. 
6 It is important to note that the Baˈath regime drafted a new constitution in 2012 after the outbreak of the 
Syrian Uprising; but, given the atrocities and massacres perpetrated by the Syrian regime, analysis of this 
constitution is considered to be out of context and less important. 
7 Although the use of neutral terms is a worldwide practice, feminist theorists have emphasized that such generic 
use deems women invisible in the Constitution. 
8 Online version of the Syrian Nationality Act (in Arabic) can be found at: http://www.cdf- 
sy.org/low/mrsom%20276.htm 
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“ˈĪmān”, 1943. http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Baath-Volume%20ICh03.pdf 
“al-jīl al-ʿArabi al-jadīd”, 1944. http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I- 
Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch36.htm 
“hawla al-rīsalah al-ʻArabīyah”, 1946. http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I- 
Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch25.htm 
“Al-Baʿath al-ʿArabī īradīt al-haīyat”, 1950. http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I- 
Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch13.htm 
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